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ABSTRACT 
The earthquake that struck Haiti in the afternoon of January 12, 2010 devastated the 
nation and left the cities of Haiti in a state of ruin.  Tens of thousands were killed in the 
wreckage, and survivors were left without the basic necessities of life.  The world quickly 
responded with a massive outpouring of aid.  However, due to the destruction of the 
infrastructure of Haiti, the coordination of this aid was challenging.  The All Partners 
Access Network (APAN), an online information exchange and collaboration tool, proved 
useful in bringing together many aid groups, including several U.S. government entities, 
to effectively address Haiti’s multitude of immediate and long-term needs.  The APAN 
data recorded the collaboration that occurred between its users.  The goal of this thesis is 
to utilize the data as a real-world example of how teams work together on unique, 
complex problems.  The data was coded and analyzed with the objective of empirically 
evaluating the Office of Naval Research model of team collaboration.  The model 
describes the individual and team cognitive processes, occurring during team 
collaboration, which facilitate decision making in seeking solutions to multifaceted, 
unique, and complex problems.  
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On January 12, 2010, at 1653 local time, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake rocked the 
nation of Haiti.  The epicenter of the quake was located near the city of Léogâne, 16 
miles west of the nation’s capital of Port-au-Prince. It was a shallow quake occurring 
only six miles beneath the surface.  To an observer on the ground the quake struck with 
an equivalent force of 35 Hiroshima bombs (Tremor Struck with the Force of 35 
Hiroshimas, 2010).  The death toll has been estimated at 220,000.  The country’s loose 
building codes contributed to the disaster.   It has been said that earthquakes do not kill 
people but buildings do.  That is certainly the case in Haiti.  The amount of rubble 
generated from the disaster has been estimated at 19 million cubic meters (Haiti One 
Year Later: The Progress to Date and the Path Forward, 2011).  Removing all of this 
rubble is still a problem even today.  The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission’s (IHRC) 
stated goal for October 2011 is to remove 4 million cubic meters of debris (Haiti One 
Year Later: The Progress to Date and the Path Forward, 2011), less than a quarter of the 
rubble present.  Poor building standards were also the result of poor construction, since 
companies in the area tried to cut down on building cost by adding sand to concrete 
mixes and using less steel rebar than normally required (“Engineers Blame Havoc on 
Cowboy Construction Code,” 2010).  In fact, a few months after the Haiti disaster, 
stronger earthquakes occurred elsewhere in Chile and Mexico, but these locations 
suffered less casualties than in Haiti.  These earthquakes were deeper into the earth than 
the Haiti quake but experts agree that the reason behind the low loss of life in these 
disasters was due to better building codes in these countries (Edwards, 2010).   The 
amount of debris would later serve as a serious impediment to aid workers trying to 
access the area since many roads were blocked.   
The government of Haiti was devastated by the disaster.  All but one ministry 
building was destroyed in the earthquake and 17% of the federal workforce died (Haiti 
One Year Later: The Progress to Date and the Path Forward, 2011).  This hampered the 
government’s ability to respond to the disaster.  Even the presidential palace was 
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destroyed, forcing the Haitian president, René Préval, to operate out of a building near 
the airport.  Haiti was a nation that was ill prepared for a disaster of this magnitude.  
Poverty plagued the nation before the earthquake.  Eighty percent of Haitians live below 
the poverty line and over half of the nation’s population lives on less than $2 a day (Haiti 
One Year Later: The Progress to Date and the Path Forward, 2011).  The country also 
suffers from political instability.  In Haiti’s 200-year history, there have been 32 coups 
overthrowing the government.    
International aid was focused on Haiti in the wake of the disaster.  However, it 
immediately became clear that coordinating the relief efforts of the various aid 
organizations was going to be difficult.  The number of relief organizations involved in 
the Haiti relief effort was immense.  Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as 
Doctors without Borders were present in Haiti in addition to state sponsored 
organizations.  Canada sent a team of search and rescue personnel in the first few days of 
the disaster, as well as the Chinese, among many others nations.   All of these 
organizations had different objectives, equipment needs, and operating procedures.  The 
United Nations (UN) could not effectively serve as a coordination body immediately 
following the earthquake since their local mission was also devastated in the disaster.  
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has operated out of 
Haiti since 2004.  MINUSTAH’s headquarters building collapsed during the quake 
killing the mission’s leader and a large portion of the mission’s staff, severely impacting 
the UN’s ability to respond to the disaster.  Language was another reason coordination 
was difficult.  Aid workers in many of these organizations spoke different languages and 
could not easily operate with each other.   The largest language barrier was with the local 
population.  A majority of the nation’s citizens speak Haitian Creole which is based on 
French.  However, the language has evolved from French to such a large degree that 
many French speakers have difficulty understanding it.   
U.S. relief efforts were led by the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID).  The agency’s mission is to provide foreign assistance to expand democracy 
and improve the lives of citizens in the developing world (About U.S. AID, n.d.).  
Numerous other government agencies also contributed to the disaster relief efforts 
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including the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Aviation Administration, and Department of 
State among many others.  The Department of Defense response to the disaster was led 
by Joint Task Force Haiti (JTF Haiti), a subordinate command to U.S. Southern 
Command (SOUTHCOM), in an operation called Unified Response.  JTF Haiti 
responded quickly to the disaster providing security forces on the ground and vital relief 
supplies within days after the quake struck.  By January 22, 2010, the U.S. military had 
13,657 personnel operating in the area (Narrative History of Operation Unified Response, 
2010).   
B. ALL PARTNERS ACCESS NETWORK 
The All Partners Access Network (APAN) is an internet-based tool which was 
used in the Haiti relief effort to facilitate collaboration among the various aid 
organizations.  The site consists of forums, wikis, chats and blogs that enable users to 
make requests for services, share information and ask or answer questions about relief 
operations.  It is an unclassified site that can be accessed by all aid workers.    Over 1700 
different individuals utilized the site during the relief effort (Pierce, 2010).  The iteration 
of APAN utilized in the Haiti relief operation was called Transnational Information 
Sharing Cooperation (TISC).  This version of APAN was created in 2008 to meet the 
needs of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).   PACOM oversees a vast operational 
area with many different countries.  The goal of this tool was to facilitate the free flow of 
information between relief organizations and the military throughout PACOM’s Area of 
Responsibility (AOR) (Ives, 2010).  In particular, the site was to be used in areas without 
sophisticated technical capabilities.  A working internet connection is all that is required 
to use the site.  The system was not in full operation before the Haiti earthquake.  In fact, 
it was simply being demonstrated to SOUTHCOM, who decided to immediately put it to 
use in Haiti.  Interestingly, a test for the site was scheduled for summer 2010 that was to 
revolve around a simulated hurricane that stuck Haiti and the Dominican Republic 
(Pierce, 2010).     
The simplicity of the site was one of the major reasons for its adoption among aid 
workers.  The site was designed to be easy to use in order to facilitate use by personnel 
who may not be technologically savvy (Pierce, 2010).  Another benefit of this tool is that 
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it enables relief providers to advertise their services allowing the user to pick and choose 
what they need.  An example of this was with the Sacré Coeur hospital in Milo, Haiti.  
The hospital was not damaged in the earthquake, but many people did not know this and 
thus the hospital was severely underutilized.  The hospital admitted only 6 people in the 
four days following the disaster.  Hospital personnel announced the availability of beds 
on APAN and the U.S. military responded by airlifting severely injured patients to the 
hospital and increasing its hospital admittance to 250 within a few days (“Technology 
Links Medical Aid and Survivors,” 2010).    
For the research conducted for this thesis we analyzed team collaboration efforts 
that occurred on APAN.  Most of the data came from the forum section of APAN.  This 
section allows users to discuss specific topics in a threaded dialog chain.  Users can post 
a question or raise an issue in the forum, which can later be answered by other users in 
the same thread.  This method of organizing issues of related content provides an easy 
way to navigate between topic threads.  The forum section was also used to share 
information such as contact emails and phone numbers or information about the 
availability of relief supplies.   
C. GOALS OF THIS STUDY  
The goal of this study was to empirically evaluate the macrocognition model of 
team collaboration developed by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) under the 
Collaboration and Knowledge Integration (CKI) program.   This study involved an 
empirical evaluation of the model using data from the real-world event of the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake.  The CKI program model of team collaboration was developed to gain insight 
into the collaboration by teams during problem solving scenarios.  The purpose of this 
research program is to better understand the cognitive processes that teams engage in as 
they gather and process information.  For this thesis we analyzed data from two themes in 
the APAN data, which were security and relief logistics.  Utilizing data from these 
themes provided the opportunity to evaluate the model using data from a real-world 
event.  The data from these two themes was separated into individual thought units on 
separate lines.  A thought unit refers to a “sequence of a few words conveying a single 
thought” (Weldon, Jehn, & Pradham, 1991, p. 559) or as “the smallest message unit that 
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can stand alone” (Keyton & Beck, 2010, p. 336).  A user’s single instance of 
communication generally consisted of more than one thought unit.  For example a user 
may have asked a question, made a request and provided contact information in the same 
post to the site.  These ideas were separated into different lines.  The content of each line, 
or thought unit, were then assigned a code in accordance with the definitions of the 
macrocognitive process included in the model.   
D. SECURITY 
There was a great need for security after the earthquake occurred.  The walls to 
the national penitentiary collapsed allowing thousands of prisoners to escape.  Some of 
these prisoners still have not been caught since the government kept poor records of 
inmate’s physical descriptions (Genzlinger, 2011).  Security has always been an issue in 
Port-au-Prince, particularly in Haiti’s largest slum Cité Soleil.  This slum has been 
described as one of the most dangerous places on earth since many criminals operate 
there (Haviv, 2006).  It is located adjacent to the western end of the runway at the 
Toussaint Louverture International Airport, which was the hub of all relief activities in 
Haiti.  Security was also needed at the food distribution centers to ensure all Haitians 
received an equal share of food and to prevent mobs from forming.  In several instances, 
older women and children were pushed away by stronger individuals who rushed towards 
aid delivery trucks (Sawer, 2010).  Looting was another issue as massive mobs openly 
raided stores in search of food.  Instances of abuse against women and children increased 
dramatically in the wake of the disaster (Lakhani, 2011).  All of these issues required a 
security presence in the area to maintain law and order.     
E. RELIEF LOGISTICS 
The relief logistics thread in the APAN data covers a wide range of topics from 
transportation of food and water to issues such as adoptions.  Numerous relief 
organizations had difficulty bringing supplies to Haiti since the Toussaint Louverture 
airport was overwhelmed with flights.  The Haitian government had difficulty controlling 
the airport in the wake of the disaster, so they turned over responsibility for airport 
operations to the U.S..  U.S. military personnel found a chaotic scene at the airport upon 
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arrival.  However, they were able to get the airport operational a day after the earthquake.  
Nevertheless the airport still suffered from several difficulties.  There were simply too 
many planes requesting permission to land in the first few days of the disaster and not 
enough space available to land them.  There was also a lack of space available to unload 
arriving aircraft of their contents.  Many flights arrived at the airport unannounced and 
were forced into a holding pattern that grew to five miles in height (Gyokeres, 2010).  
Many flights had to be diverted to other airfields early in the disaster.  This was a 
problem since the airport was one the few points of entry into the country.  The nation’s 
main seaport was severely damaged and was not immediately available for use.  Three of 
the shipyard cranes had collapsed and the harbor was filled with debris such as cargo 
containers (Robson, 2010).  Many aid workers and journalists were forced to fly to 
airports in the Dominican Republic and then cross the Haitian border via car.  The 
damage to Haiti’s transportation network increased the complexity of aid work.   
F. TIMELINE 
• 12 January 2010 
o A 7.0 magnitude earthquake strikes Haiti.  The epicenter was located at 
near the city of Léogâne and struck at 1653 local time. 
• 13 January 2010  
o First elements of Department of Defense (DoD) humanitarian assistance 
arrive in Haiti at dawn. 
o 1st Special Operations Wing arrives in Haiti and reopens the Toussaint 
Louverture International Airport.  U.S. military aircraft immediately begin 
to deliver relief supplies. 
o Coast Guard cutter Higgins arrives to start evacuating American citizens. 
o A 17 person USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) arrives 
in Haiti to assess humanitarian needs and to coordinate relief efforts with 
the Haitian government.  
o Search and rescue teams from local U.S. communities including Fairfax 
County, VA, and Los Angeles County, CA, arrive in Port-au-Prince to 
look for survivors.  
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o U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, Kenneth H. Merten, declares a state of 
emergency in Haiti allowing funds to be utilized to provide immediate 
assistance.  
• 14 January 2010 
o U.S. SOUTHCOM establishes Joint Task Force – Haiti and designates it 
as the lead command and control organization for the DoD’s relief efforts.  
• 15 January 2010 
o United States aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson arrives off the coast of 
Haiti to assist in relief efforts. 
o U.S. government announces a special immigration status for Haitians 
living in the U.S. which protects them from deportation for 18 months.   
o Russian search and rescue teams cease all activity at night due to looting 
and other insecurity in the area.   
• 16 January 2010 
o Haitian President René Préval meets with Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton and USAID Administrator Raj Shah along with other U.S. 
government officials in Haiti to discuss relief operations. 
• 19 January 2010 
o U.S. SOUTHCOM establishes Joint Logistics Command Haiti to 
coordinate the movement of supplies to Haiti. 
o USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) arrives off the coast of 
Haiti.  The ARG includes the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and 
facilities to provide relief supplies and medical care.   
o A Canadian team finishes the installation of lights on the runway at the 
Jacmel Airport in Haiti.  This allows for 24 hour flight operations and 
relieves congestion at the Toussaint Louverture International Airport.  
• 20 January 2010 
o The hospital ship USNS Comfort arrives off the coast of Haiti to provide 
medical assistance.  
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o A 5.9 magnitude aftershock strikes Haiti.  This is the largest aftershock 
since the earthquake.  
• 22 January 2010 
o Total U.S. personnel in the Haiti Joint Operational Area grows to 13,657 
personnel with 3,258 personnel ashore and 10,399 afloat. 
o Government of Haiti announces new adoption procedures to protect 
children leaving the country.  These new procedures were intended to 
prevent the abuse of children and human trafficking.   
• 23 January 2010 
o Haitian government ends its formal search for survivors. 
• 25 January 2010  
o 24th MEU begins to distribute relief supplies to areas around the northwest 
portion of the capital. 
• 28 January 2010 
o Food distribution continues to be a problem.  UN personnel are forced to 
use rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse mobs at several food 
distribution centers.  
• 5 February 2010 
o U.S. government’s efforts in Haiti officially transition from Phase I 
(Emergency) to Phase II (Relief) operations. 
• 8 February 2010 
o Evans Monsignac is rescued from a collapsed building after spending 27 
days trapped in the rubble.  
• 21 April 2010 
o Haitian President René Préval announces the creation of the Interim 
Commission for the Reconstruction of Haiti (IHRC) to help coordinate 





• 31 March 2010  
o International Donors Conference: Towards a New Future for Haiti was 
held in New York City at the United Nations Headquarters.  The 
conference raised funds from numerous organizations to help fund the 
Haiti recovery efforts.  
• 1 June 2010 
o U.S. military announces the end of major relief operations in Haiti.  A 500 
man force of U.S. National Guard Troops remain in Haiti until September 
to provide additional support.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. COGNITION 
As this thesis focuses on aspects of the workings of the human mind, it would be 
well to discuss some of the academic underpinnings of the concepts used in this study.  
Philosophers and scientists have long been curious about the ways in which humans 
perceive, process and transmit information.  In other words, they endeavored to 
understand human cognition.   
1. Historical Views–Two Brief Examples 
a. David Hume 
David Hume, the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher and historian, is 
considered by many philosophers to be a precursor of modern cognitive science (Morris, 
2009).  Hume viewed the study of human understanding as necessary to the good of 
humankind and having a liberating effect upon the mind.  “The only method of freeing 
learning…is to enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding…We must 
submit to this fatigue, in order to live at ease ever after” (Hume, 1777, section 1, 
subsection 7).   
To Hume, human understanding required deep exploration and enquiry.  
He also believed that careful scientific study, in spite of the difficulties sure to be 
encountered, would produce a certainty of knowledge in the subject of human cognition.  
“It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science barely to know the different 
operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper 
heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder, in which they lie involved, when made the 
object of reflexion and enquiry…But may we not hope, that philosophy, if cultivated with 
care, may carry its researches still farther, and discover, at least in some degree, the secret 
springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations?  …that, if 
it lie within the compass of human understanding, it may at last be happily achieved; if 
not, it may, however, be rejected with some confidence and security” (Hume, 1777, 
section 1, subsections 8 & 9).   
 12
b. Immanuel Kant 
The German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, is credited with laying many of 
the fundamental principles of cognitive science (Brook, 2008).  Though he is 
acknowledged to have developed much of his work on epistemology as a response to 
David Hume (Brook, 2008), he articulated concepts, which remain basic to the study of 
cognition more than two hundred years after his death (Brook, 2008).   
Kant defined his model of cognitive architecture with three main ideas.   
(1) The mind is composed of intricate, distinct abilities or 
functions.  To understand the mind, these functions must be observed and described to 
the greatest accuracy possible (Brook, 2008). 
(2) The functions necessary for the generation of knowledge within 
the mind are the processing of sensory inputs, within the space and time domains, applied 
to concepts also within the mind (Brook, 2008).   
(3) The functions of the mind, necessary for cognition, are forms 
of synthesis.  Examples of synthesis are generation of temporal and spatial structure, 
association of temporal spatial structures to each other, and it must recognize items, using 
concepts in the mind (Brook, 2008).   
2. Categories 
In more modern times, cognition has been broken down into categories based 
upon what type of thought it describes and where it occurs.   
a. Microcognition 
Microcognition consists of the most basic building blocks of mental 
activity and occurs entirely within the mind of the individual (Letsky & Warner, 2008).  
These are processes that are more commonly studied in the laboratory than in naturalistic 
settings.  Examples of microcognitive processes include perceptions of sensory inputs 
(sight, sound, taste, smell, touch), installing these perceptions into long and short-term 
memory storage, and recall of memory.  Individuals may possess these faculties to 
 13
varying degrees of efficiency.  Some may possess more acute eyesight, greater ability to 
memorize details, or faster recall of memory, but, aside from anomalous cases, all 
possess these to greater or lesser degrees.   
b. Metacognition 
Metacognition concerns awareness of cognition.  Expressed another way, 
it is “thought about thought” (Letsky & Warner, 2008).  To illustrate how metacognition 
is theorized to act in the human mind, it could be likened to an overseer who monitors the 
thought processes and makes judgments as to how well they are going.  If they are 
plodding along inefficiently, the metacognitive overseer may make suggestions to 
improve them (Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 2003).   
Metacognition is a sort of cognitive quality control process.  In 
manufacturing processes, the quality engineer monitors the quality of predetermined 
parameters.  If any of these parameters exceed specified values, the process is deemed out 
of control and the quality engineer may suggest corrections.  In like manner, 
metacognition in the human mind makes adjustments to facilitate efficient cognition 
(Smith et al., 2003).   
3. Macrocognition 
Macrocognition is a much broader topic.  It draws from many academic 
disciplines, including psychology, computer science, philosophy, business management, 
and mathematics (Letsky, Warner, Fiore, & Smith, 2008).  Wroblewski and Warner 
defined it as “the high-level mental processes, both external and internal, used by team 
members while engaged in collaborative problem solving” (Wroblewski & Warner, 2008, 
p. 353).   
For the purpose of this thesis, two current constructs of macrocognition are 
discussed.  Fiore et al. presented a five-dimensional model of macrocognition in teams 
that focused on the knowledge building process (2010), while Klein described the 
functions and supporting processes of macrocognition built up around naturalistic 
decision making (Schraagen, Klein, & Hoffman, 2008).   
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a. Fiore et al. Macrocognition Model 
The Fiore et al. model is described in Table 1.  (Note that this table only 
shows the first four dimensions of the model, with the fifth dimension being the outcome 
of the other four dimensions.)   
Table 1.   Specification of Macrocognitive Dimensions and Subdimensions (From Burke, 
Salas, Smith-Jentsch, & Rosen, 2010). 
Construct Definition 
Internalized Team Knowledge 
Team Knowledge 
Similarity 
…the degree to which differing roles understand one another…, or how 




Team members collective understanding of resources/responsibilities 
associated with the task.  Specific forms include: task knowledge stock 
(Austin, 2003), interpositional knowledge, recognition of teammate 
expertise, individual situation awareness. 




The team’s collective agreement as to their task strategies and the 




The accuracy of the patterns or trends explicitly noted by members of a 
team that is either agreed upon or unchallenged by other team members. 
Uncertainty 
Resolution 
The degree to which a team has collectively agreed upon the status of the 
problem variables. 




Involves actions individuals engage in to add to their existing knowledge 




Involves comparing relationships among information, context, and artifacts 
to develop actionable knowledge. 
Knowledge Object 
Development 
Involves creation of cognitive artifacts that represent actionable knowledge 
for the task. 
Team Knowledge Building Process 
Team Information 
Exchange 




Involves explanations and interpretations shared between team members or 
with the team as a whole.  These explanations may be augmented by 
graphic visualizations or shared workspaces. 






& Negotiation of 
Alternatives 
Clarifying and discussing the pros and cons of potential solution options. 
Team Process & 
Plan Regulation 
Discussing or critiquing the team’s knowledge building process or plan 
following feedback on its effectiveness. 
 
b. Klein Macrocognition Model 
In a slightly different paradigm, macrocognition was posited as the 
framework for naturalistic decision making.  Specifically, it emerged in the study of 
cognitive processes in naturalistic settings (Schraagen et al., 2008) and was related to the 
Recognition-Primed Decision-Making (RPD) model presented by Klein et al. (Klein, 
1998).   
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) is best defined by first describing 
what it is not.  In what can be termed “classical” decision-making methods, the 
participants first gather information on the problem.  Then they formulate solution 
options to the problem.  This is followed by determining relevant parameters for the 
options and assigning each a level of importance, or weight.  After grading the 
parameters of each option, the option scores are tallied.  The option with the highest score 
is deemed the best solution to the problem (Klein, 2008).   
This method was studied for decades, but difficulties remained in relating 
it to how people actually made decisions outside of the laboratory.  It was assumed that 
the classical method was optimal and most field research focused upon how to improve 
the decision-making process of real people.  When it began to dawn upon researchers that 
subjects with significant levels of expertise never made decisions optimally, but yet 
consistently made good decisions, it became obvious that a different approach was 
required (Klein, 2008).   
Research then shifted its focus to discovering how experts actually made 
decisions in real world, or naturalistic settings.  Problem-solving events (such as 
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firefighting, military C2 tasks, hospital emergency rooms, etc.) were sought where 
operators were able to make difficult decisions in time-pressured, uncertain, high stakes, 
ambiguous, unstable conditions with uncertain goals.  From this research emerged several 
models of NDM (Klein, 2008).   
Recognition-primed decision making (RPD) is the primary model 
developed under the NDM paradigm (Klein, 2008).  When studying the decision-making 
processes of firefighters and a wide range of other decision makers under time-pressured, 
naturalistic, complex, ambiguous settings, Klein et al. came to the conclusion that 
individuals and teams with significant degrees of expertise did not consciously weigh 
multiple options before making critical decisions (Klein, 1998).  They recognized a given 
situation as being similar to a prototypical scenario for which they had confidence in the 
knowledge they knew the correct approach (Klein, 1998).  If the situation proved to be 
other than what was initially perceived, these experts could usually find another 
prototype scenario similar to the one at hand (Klein, 1998).   
Klein’s model of macrocognition is illustrated in Figure 1.  The functions 




Figure 1.   Naturalistic Decision-Making Macrocognition Model (From Schraagen et al., 
2008). 
B. EMPIRICAL MODEL OF TEAM COLLABORATION 
1. Development 
In 2003, several theories on team collaboration (as cited in Warner & Letsky, 
2008) were incorporated into the first comprehensive model of team collaboration.  With 
the subsequent addition of further unique and overlapping theories, the Preliminary 
Conceptual Model of Collaboration was synthesized by integrating the various 
descriptive stages and processes from these related theories (Warner & Letsky, 2008).   
a. Macrocognition-Focused Model of Team Collaboration 
Further refinement of the model, through better definition of the problem 
area domain and improved distinction between the collaboration stages, eventually 
resulted in the macrocognition-focused model (Warner & Letsky, 2008), shown in 
Figure 2.     
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Figure 2.   Model of Team Collaboration: Focus on Macrocognition (From Warner & 
Letsky, 2008). 
(1) Inputs.  During formation, the following are provided to the 
team and determine its characteristics and focus: a description of the problem; team 
member expertise; organizational structure; roles and responsibilities of each team 
member; and projected events and future information (Warner & Letsky, 2008).   
(2) Collaboration Stages and Cognitive Processes.  There are four 
interdependent stages in the model.  These are knowledge construction, collaborative 
team problem-solving, team consensus, and outcome, evaluation and revision.  The 
stages are not necessarily sequential.  Because the process includes feedback from the 
outcome stage, the entire procedure may become iterative with data, information, and 
knowledge flowing freely back to cognitive processes employed by the decision maker in 
previous stages until the final solution is deemed appropriate (Warner & Letsky, 2008).   
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b. Measurement-Focused Model of Team Collaboration 
Subsequently, this model was refocused to facilitate measurement and 
adopted the Burke et al. construct of macrocognition dimensions (see Table 1).  This is 
the current model that was used for this research and is illustrated in Figure 3.   
 
Figure 3.   Model of Team Collaboration: Focus on Measurement (From Fiore, Smith-
Jentsch, Salas, Warner, & Letsky, 2010). 
(1) Individual Knowledge Building involves individual team 
members building their own knowledge, either by internal or external means.  Example 
processes include the following: Individual Information Gathering (IIG), individuals 
adding to their existing knowledge through direct gathering; Individual Information 
Synthesis (IIS), individuals developing actionable knowledge by comparing relationships 
among information, context, and artifacts; and Knowledge Object Development (KOD), 
individual creation of cognitive artifacts for the purpose of supporting the creation of 
actionable knowledge (Fiore et al., 2010). 
(2) In the Team Knowledge Building stage, team members 
disseminate information and transform that information into actionable knowledge for 
other team members.  Processes included within Team Knowledge Building are: Team 
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Information Exchange (TIE), team members passing relevant information to appropriate 
teammates; Team Knowledge Sharing (TKS), team members sharing explanations and 
interpretations with other team members; Team Solution Option Generation (TSOG), 
team members developing and offering potential solution options; Team Evaluation and 
Negotiation of Alternatives (TENA), team members clarifying and discussing the pros and 
cons of potential solutions options; and Team Process and Plan Regulation (TPPR), team 
members discussing and critiquing the team’s knowledge building process or plan (Fiore 
et al., 2010).   
(3) Internalized Team Knowledge is the sum of knowledge of the 
individual team members.  Its subcomponents are the following: Team Knowledge 
Similarity (ITK), the level of team members understanding each other’s roles and 
knowledge of team critical goals and resources; and Team Knowledge Resources (TKR), 
the team’s collective understanding of resources and responsibilities associated with the 
task (Fiore et al., 2010).    
(4) Externalized Team Knowledge refers to team members 
explicitly agreeing to, or not openly challenging, facts, relationships, and concepts.  The 
subcomponents of this dimension include the following: Externalized Cue-Strategy 
Associations (ECSA), team’s collective agreement on task strategies and situational cues 
that modify these strategies; Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis (PRTA), team 
members agreement upon, or lack of challenge to, the accuracy of patterns or trends 
noted by team members; and Uncertainty Resolution (UR), describing the degree to 
which a team collectively agrees on the status of problem variables (Fiore et al., 2010).   
(5) Team Problem Solving Outcomes refer to assessments of the 
quality of a team’s problem solutions or plan.  This stage contains the following 
subcomponents: Quality of Plan (QOP)/Problem Solving Solution, refers to the degree 
that the solution adopted by a problem-solving team achieves a resolution to the problem; 
Efficiency of Planning Process (EPP), the amount of time it takes the team to arrive at a 
successful solution to the problem; and Efficiency of Plan Execution (EPE), compares the 
quality of the plan to the cost of executing it in time and resources (Fiore et al., 2010).   
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III. METHOD  
A. DATA SELECTION PROCESS 
1. All Partners Access Network (APAN) 
The communication records of the 2010 Haiti earthquake relief effort on the All 
Partners Access Network (APAN) consisted of blogs, briefings, forum transcripts, and 
military situation reports.  However, the data for this study primarily consisted of the 
forum transcripts, due to the highly interactive nature of the communications between 
relief workers displayed therein.  These transcripts had been previously separated into 
themes, according to the primary subjects addressed by the communication, using Lexical 
Link Analysis (LLA), as described in the following paragraph.  For instance, if the 
subject of the communication was regarding a sewer system, the theme may be 
“sanitation.”  There could also be cases in which more than one theme applied.  An 
example of this would be a communication about the security of food supplies to a 
hospital.  In this case, the themes of “security,” “food,” and “hospital” all may apply.   
a. Lexical Link Analysis (LLA) 
Lexical Link Analysis (LLA) was used to develop the themes of the 
APAN data.  It is a tool for examining text to determine the dominant themes that exist 
with the body of text.  Based upon the automated parsing of documents, it develops 
themes from the frequency of occurrence of certain key words (Hutchins, Zhao, & 
Kendall, 2011).  Among the themes that were developed from the use of LLA were 
“hospital,” “disease,” “security,” and “relief/logistics/NGOs.”   
b. Selected Themes 
It was desired to use as few themes as possible for our analysis, while still 
having enough material to conduct a valid study.  This was based upon the assumption 




discussions than more meager themes.  A second assumption was that deeper, lengthy 
discussion threads would provide more material for validating the model of team 
collaboration. 
It was known that the process of theme selection could potentially be 
iterative.  First, one theme must be selected.  If, after close examination, it was found that 
the selected theme did not contain enough material for analysis, a second theme would be 
required.  This process would continue until enough material was garnered for the study.  
With these points in mind, the themes selected were “Security” and “Relief / Logistics / 
NGOs” (Non-Governmental Organizations).   
(1) Security.  The security theme contained discussion threads 
pertaining to security and peripheral issues.  These included personal security of Haitian 
refugees and relief workers, as well as security of food and relief supplies.  It also 
contained the issues of training, manning and equipping of security forces, such as police.   
(2) Relief/Logistics/NGOs.  All discussion threads regarding 
delivery and logistics of relief supplies, as wells as administrative discussions on NGOs 
are contained within this theme.  This also includes discussions on procedural difficulties 
that arise from the cultural differences between military organizations and NGOs.   
c. Participating Organizations 
The data within the themes of security and relief/logistics/NGOs had been 
entered into the APAN site by a wide array of organizations participating in the relief 








Table 2.   Organizations Participating in the Security and Relief/Logistics/NGOs APAN 
Themes 
 
Military Government Civilian NGOs Commercial 
U.S. Army - 82nd Airborne Division World Health Organization Make It Right AAR Global Solutions 
U.S. Army - 7th Civil Support Command Polk County Florida - 
Department of Public Safety 
Caribbean Missions Activation Services T Y 
Lin Intertiol 
United States Southern Command United States Department of 
State 
Global Institute For 
Disruptive Events 
Barbary Services LLC 
National Guard USAID Missionaries of 
Charity 
BD Palantir Tech 
National Defense University Pacific Disaster Center Hillside Church Construction 
Management Arcotec SA 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency United Nations Platform for 
Space-based Information for 
Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response (UN-
SPIDER) 
InSTEDD CTO SkyVision Global 
Networks 
United States Air Force Reserve   Lamp for Haiti The Millenium Group 
United States Department of Defense   Partners in Health Ceres Environmental 
Services 
United States Pacific Command   Medical Relief 
International 
Southern Pulse 
Joint Language University   Project K.I.D. URS Corp 
United States Coast Guard   International 
Mission Board 
Emicus.com 
Canada Department of National Defence   Team Rubicon Kingston Global Partners 
Defense Information Systems Agency   The Scarlet Project Saha Software 
Foundation 




United States Air Force - 601st Air and 
Space Operations Center 
  World Cares Center Rapid Response 
Consulting 
Tennessee Air National Guard     T.Y. Lin International 
      CE2 Engineers 
 24
B. CODING PROCESS 
1. Data Organization 
APAN data was generated, stored, and processed in a Microsoft Structured Query 
Language (MSSQL) database.  However, as the authors were more familiar with other 
software, both in terms of manipulating and presenting data, the data was exported to 
Excel.  
After the themes were selected, the next major step was to assign macrocognitive 
codes to the material within the discussion threads.  A necessary intermediate step was to 
separate these into individual thought units. 
a. Separation of Thought Units 
The discussion threads were initially separated only by the persons 
entering their portions of the discussion into APAN.  These could be as short as a single 
word, or as long as several pages.  However, to be coded, the discussion had to be broken 
down into individual thought units.  A thought unit is the smallest message, which can 
express a complete idea by itself, or a “sequence of a few words conveying a single 
thought” (Welden, Jehn, & Pradhan, 1991, p. 559) or “the smallest message unit that can 
stand alone” (Keyton & Beck, 2010, p. 336).  Often, sentences express more than one 
idea.  The sentence, “I found that the orphanage was lacking food, but the children were 
in good spirits,” contains two separate, but related thought units.   
2. Practice Coding 
To familiarize the coders with the coding process, the authors conducted practice 
coding on real data from a previous study.  This coding was conducted independently on 
200 lines of thought units by each coder.  The results were then critiqued to determine the 
best code for each thought unit.  This procedure was then repeated on 162 lines of 
thought units from the Haiti earthquake APAN data.  This provided two significant 
benefits.  It gave practice to the coders, which made coding of the actual data less 
laborious.  It also helped solidify code definitions and applicability in the minds of the 
coders.   
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3. Code Assignment Paradigms 
Codes were assigned from both the Fiore et al. and Klein models of 
macrocognition.  Two persons coded independently on all thought units for the Security 
and Relief/Logistics/NGOs themes.  All possible codes from both models were 
considered, but only the single code from each model deemed most applicable was 
assigned.  After coders completed their independent coding, these code sets were 
compared.  Where there was disagreement, the final code was determined by discussing 
the reasons for the code assigned, and assigning the code that was judged to be most 
valid.   
a. Fiore et al. Macrocognition Model Codes 
The macrocognition dimensions from the Fiore et al. model were used, in 
addition to new codes, which emerged from studies of team collaboration in real-world, 
high stakes, unique problem sets.  These are Decision to Take Action / Request to Take 
Action (DTA-RTA) and Decision to Take Action / Course of Action (DTA-COA).  They 
are especially applicable to scenarios typically encountered by military, firefighters, 
police, and emergency workers, in which decisions must be made because lives may be at 
stake (Hutchins & Kendall, 2010).   
The definitions for each of the Fiore et al. codes are shown in Table 3.  For 
actual examples, from the APAN data, of situations and thought units for which each of 
these codes apply, see Table 4.   
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Table 3.   Macrocognitive Process Definitions for the Fiore et al. Macrocognition Model 




Involves actions individuals engage in to add to their existing 




Involves comparing relationships among information, context, 
and artifacts to develop actionable knowledge. 
Knowledge Object 
Development (KOD) 
Involves creation of cognitive artifacts that represent actionable 
knowledge for the task. 
Team Information 
Exchange (TIE) 
Involves passing relevant information to the appropriate 
teammates at the appropriate times. 
Team Knowledge 
Sharing (TKS) 
Involves explanations and interpretations shared between team 
members or with the team as a whole.  These explanations may 
be augmented by graphic visualizations or shared workspaces. 
Team Solution Option 
Generation (TSOG) 
Offering potential solutions to a problem. 
Team Evaluation & 
Negotiation of 
Alternatives (TENA) 
Clarifying and discussing the pros and cons of potential solution 
options. 
Team Process & Plan 
Regulation (TPPR) 
Discussing or critiquing the team’s knowledge building process 
or plan following feedback on its effectiveness. 
Team Knowledge 
Similarity (ITK) 
…the degree to which differing roles understand one another…, 
or how well the team members understand the critical goals and 
locations of important resources. 
Team Knowledge 
Resources (TKR) 
Team members collective understanding of 
resources/responsibilities associated with the task.  Specific 
forms include: task knowledge stock (Austin, 2003), 
interpositional knowledge, recognition of teammate expertise, 




The team’s collective agreement as to their task strategies and 
the situational cues that modify those strategies (and how). 
Pattern Recognition and 
Trend Analysis (PRTA) 
The accuracy of the patterns or trends explicitly noted by 
members of a team that is either agreed upon or unchallenged by 
other team members. 
Uncertainty Resolution The degree to which a team has collectively agreed upon the 
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Code Definition 
(UR) status of the problem variables. 
Decision to Take Action / 
Request to Take Action 
(DTA-RTA) 
This is a peer-to-peer request to conduct a specific action.  This 
only applies when the communication cannot be considered 
imperative, but rather in the form of a petition. 
Decision to Take Action / 
Course of Action (DTA-
COA) 
This is similar to DTA-RTA, with the primary differences that 
this is superior-to-subordinate direction to take a specific course 
of action.  This code applies when the communication is 
considered imperative, rather than in the nature of a request. 
 
Table 4.   APAN Data Coding Examples for the Fiore et al. Macrocognition Model 
(Fiore et al., 2010). 
Code Example Thought Units (Note 1) 
Individual Information 
Gathering (IIG) 








Team Information  
Exchange (TIE) 
“You will receive a text from the red cross as confirmation.” 
Team Knowledge  
Sharing (TKS) 
“Over the course of the next few days (beginning as we speak), 
the security situation will likely get worse before it gets better.” 
Team Solution Option 
Generation (TSOG) 
“They are currently looking for strategic locations to put up tent 
camps and I believe your location will be fantastic.” 
Team Evaluation & 
Negotiation of  
Alternatives (TENA) 
“This is a quick and easy way to help the people of Haiti.” 
Team Process & Plan 
Regulation (TPPR) 
“Because Haiti is in such a flux of constant change, events, etc. 
is there a plan that manages all of this data and information and 
will be leveraged for issues like Logistics, Comm’s, NGO 
management, etc. and then distributed to appropriate groups that 
will be affected and need to know by these elements?”  
Team Knowledge  Note 2 
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Code Example Thought Units (Note 1) 
Similarity (ITK) 







Pattern Recognition and 





Decision to Take Action / 
Request to Take Action  
(DTA-RTA) 
 “Request update and assistance for our shipment of food and 
meds expected at local clinics.”  
 
Decision to Take Action / 
Course of Action (DTA-
COA) 
Note 2 
Note 1: Thought units selected as examples are based upon final codes assigned after both coders had 
independently coded the data.   
Note 2: Thought units for which this code applied were not found in the data.   
 
b. Klein Macrocognition Model Codes 
In addition to the Fiore et al. model codes, all thought units were reviewed 
to determine the applicability of macrocognitive processes from the Klein model.  The 
definitions used when applying these codes are shown in 0For actual examples, from the 










Table 5.   Coding Scheme Paradigms for the Klein Macrocognition Model (Klein et al., 
2003). 
Code Paradigm 
Anticipatory Thinking (AT) This refers to foresight or anticipation of the need to address a 
pending hypothetical scenario or problem.  This differs from 
Problem Detection in that AT refers to a problem that has not yet 
occurred and is only anticipated. 
Assessing Risk (AR) This involves evaluation of the risk or potential danger expected 
within a solution option. 
Problem Detection (PD) The PD code involved thought units that referred to problems that 
were real and detected, not to problems hypothetical or anticipated. 
Planning / Replanning (PR) This involves planning required for a specific event/situation.  If 
circumstances, or the perception thereof, change, this also involves 
replanning the solution option. 
Sensemaking (SM) The process of building, and constantly revising, the framework of 
the problem and its parameters.  As inputs to the problem are 
received, they are incorporated into the framework, revising it as 
needed. 
Using Analogues (UA) Comparisons between the current and previous situations, focusing 
on the similarities. 
Table 6.   APAN Data Coding Examples for the Klein Macrocognition Model (Klein et 
al., 2003). 
Code Example Thought Units (Note 1) 
Anticipatory Thinking (AT) “All operators are advised that fuel and other ground support service 
may be unavailable.” 
Assessing Risk (AR) Note 2 
Problem Detection (PD) “I have a client who needs to evac personnel from Jacmel.” 
Planning / Replanning (PR) “It would seem to me that another way of getting these people out of 
the disaster area would be to take them by ship to a place to be 
screened.” 
Sensemaking (SM) “We just lack the capacity to get it done.” 
Using Analogues (UA) “Here in Alaska, we do not deal in large populations, but we do deal 
in serious long distance logistics in the aviation and maritime 
environments in harsh conditions.” 
Note 1: Thought units selected as examples are based upon final codes assigned after both coders had 
independently coded the data.   
Note 2: Thought units for which this code applied were not found in the data.   
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4. Inter-Rater Reliability 
When research is done in which the coding of data contains an element of 
subjectivity, there is a need to evaluate the quality of the data collection method.  Often, 
data is analyzed and coded by people referred to as raters.  It then becomes important to 
determine the consistency between raters, or in this case, coders, in which the data coding 
method was applied.  Inter-rater reliability refers to the measure of the degree of 
similarity in data coding method applied by the raters to the same set of data (Gwet, 
2008). 
a. Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient 
Several statistical methods can be used to determine inter-rater reliability.  
This study used the Cohen’s kappa coefficient.  It provides a measure of the degree to 
which two raters concur in their respective sorting of a given number of items into 
several mutually exclusive categories (Lowry, 2001).  There are several online and 
downloadable tools to determine the value of the Cohen’s kappa test from a given set of 
data.  This study used the AgreeStat standalone Excel workbook, available for free 
download from http://agreestat.com/agreestat.html.  The code sets were input into the 
AgreeStat workbook, which then generated the kappa value.   
The standard for determination of the quality of the kappa value used for 
this study is shown in Table 7.  These values are based solely upon the professional 
opinions of Landis and Koch (Landis & Koch, 1977).   
Table 7.   Kappa Values for Strength of Agreement (From Landis & Koch, 1977) 
Kappa Value Strength of Agreement 
< 0.00 Poor 
0.00 – 0.20 Slight 
0.21 – 0.40 Fair 
0.41 – 0.60 Moderate 
0.61 – 0.80 Substantial 
0.81 – 1.00 Almost Perfect 
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IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
A. OVERVIEW 
Each author independently coded the APAN data from the Security and Relief 
Logistics themes.  Independent coding of the data allowed each coder to interpret the data 
individually and without introducing bias upon each other.  The Security theme consisted 
of 722 thought units while the Relief Logistics theme contained 1,260 thought units for a 
total of 1,982 thought units.  The large number of thought units provided each coder with 
ample examples of communications to analyze to empirically evaluate the model of team 
collaboration.  Selecting two themes from the 40 themes identified by the Lexical Link 
Analysis (as discussed in Chapter III) allowed each author to focus their analysis of the 
interagency collaboration between aid workers to only two topics.  Appendices A and B 
contain a complete list of the communications conducted under each theme.  Names, 
email addresses and phone numbers have been redacted for privacy concerns.  
Subsequent to the authors coding the data individually they met to compare coding 
assignments.  During that meeting the coders discussed their coding of each thought unit 
and when they disagreed they each presented their reasoning.  They were able to reach an 
agreement on a final code assignment for each thought unit.  Both coder’s coding and the 
final code are included in Appendix A and B.   
B. ANALYSIS OF FIORE ET AL. CODES 
1. Team Information Exchange 
Table 8 provides the percentages of codes assigned to both the Security and Relief 
Logistics themes.  This table is based on the final coding assignments agreed upon by 
both coders.  The code assigned most often in both themes was Team Information 
Exchange (TIE).  The sheer dominance of TIE is apparent.  The high usage of TIE was an 
expected result based on previous research on this topic.  A majority of team 
collaboration in most situations is likely to involve information exchange.  Teams 
operating in dynamic situations need to keep each other informed of the changing 
environment.  Information exchange was a priority in the wake of the Haiti disaster since 
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many users were unfamiliar with the area or the current situation on the ground.  Another 
reason for the large amount of TIE is due to the fact that information exchange occurs 
frequently in a forum type atmosphere.  Many individuals used the forums in the APAN 
collaboration system to find information or to post responses to other user’s inquiries.  
Some examples of the information posted to the forums include flight information and 
availability of relief supplies.  TIE was also used for thought units that presented 
rhetorical questions.  For example, one user wrote “What is One Response?” then 
proceeded to describe the purpose of the One Response website.  These types of posts 
also increased the instances of the TIE code.   
Table 8.   Percentage of Communications Coded as Macrocognitive Processes 
Code Macrocognitive Process Categories Percentage of Thought Units 
    Security Relief Logistics 
Individual Knowledge Building 
IIG Individual Information Gathering 7.94% 9.26% 
IIS Individual Information Synthesis  0% 0% 
KOD Knowledge Object Development  0% 0% 
Team Knowledge Building 
TIE Team Information Exchange 69.50% 68.32% 
TKS Team Knowledge Sharing 6.55% 2.47% 
TSOG Team Solution Option Generation 2.09% 2.39% 
TENA Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives 2.23% 1.36% 
TPPR Team Process and Plan Regulation  0.14% 0.08% 
Internalized Team Knowledge 
ITK Team Knowledge Similarity  0% 0% 
TKR Team Knowledge Resources 0% 0% 
Externalized Team Knowledge 
UR  Uncertainty Resolution  0% 0% 
ECSA  Externalized Cue-Strategy Associations   0% 0% 
PRTA  Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis  0% 0% 
Problem Solving Outcomes 
QOP  Quality of Plan/Problem-Solving Solution 0% 0% 
EPP  Efficiency of Planning Process 0% 0% 
EPE  Efficiency of Plan Execution 0% 0% 
Decision to take Action (DTA) 
COA  DTA (Course of Action) 0% 0% 
RTA  DTA (Request to Take Action) 3.20% 4.95% 
Miscellaneous   
MISC Miscellaneous   8.36% 10.61% 
NC Non Codable  0.00% 0.56% 
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2. Miscellaneous and Non-Codable  
The second most frequently assigned code was the Miscellaneous Code (MISC).  
MISC was used in thought units that did not provide meaningful team collaboration.  
Thought units such as “thank you” or “got it” were coded as MISC.  A MISC was also 
used whenever a user simply provided their contact information such as their email 
address or telephone number.  These instances occurred frequently in the data.  There 
were also instances during coding where the thought unit was unintelligible.  These 
thought units were labeled as Non-Codable (NC).  Some of the NCs were assigned 
because a user utilized an unknown acronym.  An example of this was a post where the 
user stated “WIE until UFN.”  This thought unit may contain useful information, 
however, this was not apparent to the authors.     
3. Individual Information Gathering  
Table 9 shows the frequency of each Fiore et al. code assigned during the final 
coding session while excluding the MISC and NC codes.  Excluding the MISC and NC 
codes in this table provides a better understanding of the use of the other codes.  
Individual Information Gathering (IIG) was the third most frequently assigned code.  IIG 
was assigned whenever team members attempted to add to their existing knowledge.  In a 
forum atmosphere this usually appears as a question asked by one team member to 
another.  IIG was assigned to a thought unit an 8.6% percent of the time for the Security 
theme and 10.42% of the time for the Relief Logistics theme.  The percentage usage of 
IIG were less than anticipated.  The authors expected more questions to be raised by aid 
workers given the chaotic state of the relief efforts shortly after the disaster.  The fewer 
than expected percentage use of IIGs might be explained by several reasons.   
The first is that perhaps users did not post questions to APAN because they had 
found the answers to their questions by searching for the information that was already 
posted to the site by other users.  Information posted by other users would have been 
labeled as TIE.  If a user found an answer to their question by simply looking at the 
APAN site then they would have no need to post a question.  A second reason for this 
disparity in the percentage used for this data compared with results from previous studies 
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on this topic is the fact that answering a question often involves more thought units than 
asking one.  The percentages of TIEs assigned were increased by the length of the 
response to the questions posed since more information is exchanged in the response to a 
question.  Despite the low percentage use of IIG, there were many instances where an 
individual seeking information prompted good discussions or alerted others of potential 
problems.   
Table 9.   Percentage of Communications Coded Excluding the MISC and NC codes 
Code Macrocognitive Process Categories Percentage of Thought Units 
    Security Relief Logistics 
Individual Knowledge Building 
IIG Individual Information Gathering 8.66% 10.42% 
IIS Individual Information Synthesis  0% 0% 
KOD Knowledge Object Development  0% 0% 
Team Knowledge Building 
TIE Team Information Exchange 75.84% 76.91% 
TKS Team Knowledge Sharing 7.14% 2.79% 
TSOG Team Solution Option Generation 2.28% 2.70% 
TENA Team Evaluation and Negotiation of Alternatives 2.43% 1.53% 
TPPR Team Process and Plan Regulation  0.15% 0.09% 
Internalized Team Knowledge 
ITK Team Knowledge Similarity  0% 0% 
TKR Team Knowledge Resources 0% 0% 
Externalized Team Knowledge 
UR  Uncertainty Resolution  0% 0% 
ECSA  Externalized Cue-Strategy Associations   0% 0% 
PRTA  Pattern Recognition and Trend Analysis  0% 0% 
Problem Solving Outcomes 
QOP  Quality of Plan/Problem-Solving Solution 0% 0% 
EPP  Efficiency of Planning Process 0% 0% 
EPE  Efficiency of Plan Execution 0% 0% 
Decision to take Action (DTA) 
COA  DTA (Course of Action) 0% 0% 
RTA  DTA (Request to Take Action) 3.50% 5.57% 
 
4. Team Solution Option Generation and Team Evaluation and 
Negotiation of Alternatives  
Team Solution Option Generation (TSOG) appeared 2.28% of the time in the 
Security theme and 2.7% of the time in the Relief Logistics theme.  Team Evaluation and 
Negotiation of Alternatives (TENA) was assigned for 2.43% of the data in the Security 
theme and 1.53% for the Relief Logistics theme.  TSOG occurs as team members develop 
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solutions to the problems they are presented with.  TENA occurs when users determine 
the suitability and effectiveness of various solutions.  An example of these codes can be 
observed through one relief worker’s comments.  The APAN user stated that the forum 
section of the site was a good place to coordinate planning as disaster relief efforts 
transitioned from search and rescue operations to Stability, Security, Transition and 
Reconstruction (SSTR) operations.  This is an example of TSOG because the APAN user 
is presenting a potential solution to the problem of coordinating the transition between 
phases of the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief effort.  The user added that the 
forum could also be used to notify other APAN users or relief workers of issues that 
needed to be dealt with.  This thought unit was an example of TENA since the person is 
evaluating the potential option for its ability to solve the problem.  These instances of 
TENA and TSOG show that APAN users utilized the site to present and discuss options.    
5. Team Knowledge Sharing  
There was a large disparity between the two coders over the use of Team 
Knowledge Sharing (TKS) and Team Information Exchange (TIE).  In most instances 
where one coder assigned TKS, the other coder assigned TIE.  This was true for both 
themes that were analyzed.  This may be at least partially explained by the sometimes 
hazy line between stating information and interpreting information.  TKS involves 
explanations and interpretations that are shared between team members, while TIE is 
simply information sharing with no interpretations.  This may seem like a clear 
distinction but during coding it was sometimes difficult to discern between the two.  An 
example of the hazy line between TKS and TIE can be found in one person’s post about 
the behavior of crowds during the distribution of relief supplies.  The person stated that 
“this is an impressively controlled crowd” meaning that people were generally behaving 
themselves at the aid distribution centers.  One coder assigned this thought unit a TKS 
code reasoning that the user made an interpretation of the situation on the ground.  The 
other coder labeled this thought unit as TIE since the person seemed to only be making an 
observation.  During final coding, the coders agreed upon TIE.  Later, in the same 
person’s post he stated that Haitians “are trying to be well behaved so that aid will flow.”  
One coder coded this thought unit as TIE.  The other coder coded it as TKS since the user 
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was interpreting the low instances of violence at the distribution centers as part of the 
larger effort to encourage the continued delivery of supplies.  TKS was the final code 
assigned to this thought unit since the person was indeed making an interpretation of the 
facts.  These examples show that it can be difficult sometimes to distinguish between TIE 
and TKS.   
6. Team Process and Plan Regulation  
There were only a few instances of Team Process and Plan Regulation (TPPR).  
TPPR occurs whenever a team member critiques the group’s knowledge building 
processes or plans.  Many users did not offer a critique of the plan or process.  Perhaps 
this was because there were few defined processes to criticize or evaluate during many 
operations in the early days of the disaster.  Or perhaps many users did not feel 
comfortable criticizing plans or processes in a forum setting for everyone to see.   An 
example of an instance where TPPR did occur was when a user commented on 
SOUTHCOM’s involvement in SSTR operations.  This person noted that SOUTHCOM’s 
roles and responsibilities in SSTR operations should be defined along with the anticipated 
duration of the involvement.  He went on to state that doing so would allow other 
organizations to plan accordingly.  This person offered constructive criticism of the 
process to better coordinate planning efforts.  However, the few instances of the use of 
this macrocognitive process in the data show that APAN was not the primary vehicle for 
these types of discussions.  Perhaps users conducted these types of conversations through 
other means such as through telephone or email conversations.  
7. Decision to Take Action  
There were few instances of Decision to Take Action-Course of Action (DTA-
COA).  DTA-COA occurs when a superior directs a subordinate to perform a specified 
course of action.  The low occurrence of DTA-COAs was not surprising given the 
horizontal relationship of the aid organizations operating in Haiti.  No one organization 




senior to subordinate relationships between personnel using the site.  Senior personnel 
may have indeed used the site to issue commands to subordinate personnel, but this 
relationship was not apparent in the data we analyzed.   
There were, however, several instances of Decision to Take Action-Request to 
Take Action (DTA-RTA).  DTA-RTA is assigned when a peer requests an action be 
taken by another peer.  The authors observed several peer-to-peer interactions where one 
APAN user requested actions from another without having the authority to force that 
action.  Most of the instances of DTA-RTA were largely formatting or procedural 
requests.  For example, one post was a military message requesting all ships in the area to 
provide specific check-in information over the radio as they entered the harbor.  That 
thought unit did not qualify as a DTA-COA since the message stated that providing that 
information was only voluntary as U.S. forces had no authority to enforce compliance.     
C. ANALYSIS OF NATURALISTIC DECISION-MAKING CODES 
The macrocognitive processes drawn from the Naturalistic Decision-Making 
(NDM) literature on sensemaking were assigned separately to the data.  All thought units 
were first assigned a code according to the Fiore et al. model.  If a thought unit also met 
the definition of one of the sensemaking macrocognitive process then it was assigned an 
NDM code in addition to the Fiore et al. model code.  Table 10 provides a comparison of 
the percentage of codes assigned to the data using only the macrocognitive process 
definitions for sensemaking in the Security and Relief Logistics themes.   
 
Table 10.   Percentage of Communications Coded as Naturalistic Decision-Making (NDM) 
Codes 
Natuarlistic Decision Making (NDM)  
  Security  Relief Logistics 
AT Anticipatory Thinking 0.28% 1.12% 
PD Problem Detection 8.36% 7.50% 
PR Planning and Re-planning 3.34% 2.08% 
UA Using Analogues 0.28% 0.24% 
SM Sensemaking 1.53% 0.16% 
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The table shows that NDM codes were not applicable for most of the data.  In 
these instances a NDM code was not appropriate and only a Fiore et al. code was 
assigned.  Generally, when a NDM code was assigned it corresponded to a thought unit 
that was labeled with a TIE code in the Fiore et al. model.  This shows the effectiveness 
of the NDM model in finding use of additional cognitive processes that are used by 
people who are collaborating to deal with a complex problem.  This was crucial since a 
large percentage of exchanges were coded as TIE.  Utilizing the NDM codes provided 
more insight into the cognitive processes used to respond to the Haiti humanitarian relief 
effort.  NDM codes corresponded to other Fiore et al. codes but assignments relating to 
TIE were the most dominant. 
1. Problem Detection and Anticipatory Thinking  
The most frequently assigned NDM code was Problem Detection (PD).  PD 
occurs whenever a member of the team alerts others to issues that need to be resolved.  
There were quite a few instances where users alerted others to problems that needed to be 
resolved such as orphanages that suffered from a lack of food or areas that needed more 
security.  There was a large percentage of disagreement over the use of PD and 
Anticipatory Thinking (AT) by each coder.   
AT is defined as the ability to foresee issues and make mental preparations.  
Coder 1 assigned the PD code to a thought segment 70% out of all NDM codes assigned 
while Coder 2’s percentage for PD was 55.8%.  The percentage for AT was 13.61% for 
Coder 1 and 2.68% for Coder 2.  The large differences between AT and PD coding 
assignments can be explained by the fact that there was initially a loose understanding of 
the definition separating the two codes.  Both codes deal with recognizing issues.  For 
example if someone says that not having a certain amount of supplies will probably be an 
issue later, then this might be construed as detecting a problem in which case a PD code 
would be appropriate.  On the other hand this may also be taken as an anticipating a 
potential issue and thus merit an AT code.  The confusion over the use of these codes 
explains the large differences in assignment.  
After meeting to discuss the final coding assignments, the authors separated these 
two codes by noting that the PD code is for issues that arise now while the AT code are 
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for those issues that might arrive in the future.  PD is assigned for issues that must be 
dealt with now.  AT is used for issues that may be a problem but have yet to form and 
thus are not an imminent threat.  Given the nature of the disaster relief operation in Haiti 
there were more instances of PD than AT.  This reflected the fact that there were many 
problems that needed to be addressed immediately rather than in the future.  Other studies 
of team collaboration, such as planning efforts, may have more examples of AT since 
planning efforts provide more time to consider potential issues.   
Tables 11 and 12 provide examples of the use of the AT code.  These tables show 
that the AT code corresponded to several Fiore et al. codes including TKS, TIE, TENA 
and IIG.  Tables 13 and 14 provide examples of the PD code.  A vast majority of PD 
codes corresponded to the TIE code.  This shows the effectiveness of the PD code in 
breaking out more detailed team collaboration within the TIE code. 
Table 11.   Examples from APAN data Security theme coded as Anticipatory Thinking. 




1. Over the course of the next few days (beginning as we speak), the security 
situation will likely get worse before it gets better. 
TKS AT 
2. [The issue of pre flight screening is a legitimate one,] due to the 
opportunistic approaches of terrorists attacking our aircraft. 
TKS AT 
 
Table 12.   Examples from APAN data Relief Logistics  theme coded as Anticipatory 
Thinking. 




1. Improvement in delivery method will aid some and can be implemented 
immediately, but the final solution will require security in the ground.  
TKS AT 
2. I have made contact with several organizations that will need to have 
advance ground image knowledge to create an analysis of what will be 
required for security, construction and logistics of building out such needs.  
TIE AT 
3. But this intel is going to be important for planning and logistics issues on a 
variety of fronts, such as installation and manning communications solutions 
throughout Haiti.  
TKS AT 
4. All operators are advised that fuel and other ground support services may be 
unavailable.  
TIE AT 
5. It should also be noted that the above information that I have posted might 
be construed as being a request to purchase or solicit offers on behalf of the 
RCMP or United Nations.  
TKS AT 
6. I agree that if the technical specs are out of whack, it’ll be tough.  TIE AT 
7.  All, I have a hunch many Haiti HA [humanitarian assistance] / DR [disaster 




8. The use of CAP [Cap-Haitien] will avoid the logjam at PAP [Port Au 
Prince] and is an effective innovation in putting the supplies and aid where 
they are needed .  
TENA AT 
9. Critical immediate and long-term assistance to the Haitian people will pivot 
on the ability to provide security. 
TIE AT 
10. So I need to know what to expect so we do not tie things up unnecessarily.  IIG AT 
 
 
Table 13.   Examples from APAN data Security theme coded as Problem Detection. 




1. I have a client who needs to evac personnel from Jacmel.  TIE PD 
2. I understand that there is a need for Creole-English translators for cell phone 
messages.  
TIE PD 
3. There are wide swaths of the country which are currently invisible.  TIE PD 
4. I read an article in the AOPA newsletter (pilot newsletter) linking a Miami 
Herald article about hundreds of empty seats left on flights out of PaP 
airport, with people unable to utilize them.  
TIE PD 
5. A lot of equipment was damaged or lost because of the earthquake.  TIE PD 
6. The place is calm, sad, and massively under-resourced. TIE PD 
7. No food [is] aid visible.  TIE PD 
8. The rumor is that security - a force protection requirement - is impeding aid 
delivery.  
TIE PD 
9. We’re losing patients minute to minute.  TIE PD 
10. We have very few supplies. TIE PD 
11. At this point, like I was saying, we have perhaps twelve hours of working 
materials to keep going.  
TKS PD 
12. In these operating rooms, we don’t have oxygen. TIE PD 
13. We don’t have general anesthesia. TIE PD 
14. We don’t have narcotic pain medicines in enough quantity.  TIE PD 
15. We still do not have electricity in this building.  TIE PD 
16. They have had limited ability to communicate.  TIE PD 
17. The need is to provide security for U.S. and Haitian telecommunications 
providers conducting recovery operations in country. 
TIE PD 
18. I have been informed that there is a destroyed orphanage just outside of 
Aubry, Haiti. 
TIE PD 
19. Last contact with the orphanage revealed little to no food. TIE PD 
20. [There is] a deep concern about possible criminal activity in the area.  TKS PD 
21. [Food distribution has] attracted much unhealthy attention.  TKS PD 
22. Among their 250 patients today, they had two that needed surgical expertise. TIE PD 
23. [We are] still finding it difficult to ascertain where locally to Aubry, Haiti 








Table 14.   Examples from APAN data Relief Logistics theme coded as Problem Detection. 




1. Within the facility are 400-500 children and they have about 24 hours of 
food and water left.  
TIE PD 
2. They have not been able to get in contact with relief efforts there and are 
looking for assistance.  
TIE PD 
3. [There is] no scheduled flight service into PaP yet.  TIE PD 
4. [There are] no indications of any available lodging in PaP.  TIE PD 
5. We can provide palletted 270 lb unit and solar panel from either Virginia or 
Los Angeles area, but have been unable to find a way to get it to Haiti. 
TIE PD 
6. A lot of equipment was damaged or lost because of the earthquake.  TIE PD 
7. As you know, we are rapidly exceeding our Dunkirk” style air bridges 
ability to sustain our consumables and staff at the current very high levels of 
activity.  
TIE PD 
8. We are in desperate need of support flights into Cap-Haitien (CAP) from 
CONUS.  
TIE PD 
9. Please be aware that communications within Haiti are very difficult at this 
time.  
TKS PD 
10. Someone will need to arrange transportation from Abilene to Haiti.  TIE PD 
11. Relief team on the ground in Port-au-Prince Haiti need 150 tents.  TIE PD 
12. Please be aware that communications within Haiti are very difficult at this 
time.  
TKS PD 
13. The destination clinics are in dire need of these supplies.  TKS PD 
14. There is limited capacity for unloading, storing and distributing goods in 
Haiti.  
TIE PD 
15. Jumping the water from U.S. to Haiti is the only missing piece of our 
puzzle!  
TIE PD 
16. They didn’t have radios, batteries or generators. TIE PD 
17. The earthquake silenced telephone landlines and mobile services, leaving 
Haitians in the dark in more ways than one. 
TIE PD 
18. They were told that they will need special permission (other than their U.S. 
passports) to enter back into the Dominican Republic at Jimani.  
TIE PD 
19. We have large quantity of water and tents in MIA seeking transport in to 
PaP or surrounding areas.  
TIE PD 
20. MSC or airlift support needed ASAP.  TIE PD 
21. [He] needs for all supplies and services for children remain extremely high 
and urgent.  
TIE PD 
22. Clinic near the PaP airport reporting 30 women deep, most holding babies 
sick with fever, diarrhea and rashes from living on the street. 
TIE PD 
23. The hospital administrator for Bernard Mevs Hospital located near the Port-
au-Prince airport has reported an escalating number of pediatric malaria 
cases requiring treatment.  
TIE PD 
24. The hospital official noted a limited supply of anti-malarial pharmaceuticals 
available.  
TIE PD 
25. The Haiti emergency is also a high-risk environment for sexual exploitation 
and abuse.  
TIE PD 
26. During an emergency, local populations become more dependent on others 
for their survival and thus more vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse.  
TKS PD 
27. We are in need of military or private assistance to deliver cargo capacity into 




28. We have a medical team that came in on MFI [Missionary Flights 
International] but they didn’t have a confirmed return reservation for this 
Friday and now they can’t get on MFI because they’ve cut back from 3 
flights a day to 2 and they have to get back to Florida.  
TIE PD 
29. But now we are told they aren’t flying everyday so that they could end up 
staying at the airport for several days.  
TIE PD 
30. After disaster local non-governmental agencies are the first to be cut off 
from the essential supply chain needed to serve their communities and the 
last to be reconnected.  
TIE PD 
31. An NGO needs to get a piece of spinal surgical equipment from Charleston, 
S.C. to Miami ASAP, for flight to PaP for surgery.  
TIE PD 
32. The border is open, but there is a group of boukaneys that try to stop and 
harass people for money and ask for your passport. 
TIE PD 
33. They do not have authority. TIE PD 
34. So if they have no uniforms or identification they have no right to be 
collecting money from people.  
TKS PD 
35. Lifepoint Church in Smyrna, TN has 3,000 plus pounds of building supplies 
that needs to get to Port Au Prince. 
TIE PD 
36. A team is flying down to do work but they are having problems with 
transport for the supplies. 
TIE PD 
37. We did some analysis to try to help decision makers understand a few risks 
to the displaced person camps with the rainy season coming up. 
TIE PD 
38. As we enter the beginning of the rainy season in haiti, one of the biggest 
problems facing relief organizations today is the spectre of flooding and 
mudslides destroying Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camps. 
TIE PD 
39. It has been reported that the Haitian Ministry of Economy and Finance has 
directed their customs personnel to require humanitarian organizations to 
sign over their supplies to the Haitian govt so they can screen them against 
illegal imports.  
TIE PD 
40. The U.S. embassy in PaP has not been responsive to my requests for specific 
customs protocol. 
TIE PD 
41. I’m very concerned that our medical /dental supplies and equipment could 
be detained. 
TIE PD 
42. I have heard several statements about having to turn over your relief aid to 
the Haitian government when it arrives. 
TIE PD 
 
2. Planning and Replanning  
The Planning and Re-planning (PR) code was the third most frequently assigned 
NDM code.  This code was used whenever users built a list of actions that were to be 
executed or when adjustments to previously developed plans were made.  The PR code 
was generally assigned to a thought unit that followed or was also assigned a TSOG code.  




describe a plan to implement that solution.  Sometimes the presentation of a solution and 
a discussion of a plan occurred in the same thought unit.  The relationship between TSOG 
and PR was demonstrated in the following example:  
It would seem to me that another way of getting these people out of the 
disaster area would be to take them by ship to a place to be screened, like 
GITMO, or someplace nearby, or to a U.S. port.   
 
In this thought unit, the user offered a potential solution to the problem of getting people 
out of the disaster area.  The user then described the plan to handle this effort through the 
use of a ship or a port facility.  Tables 15 and 16 show examples of PR. 
 
Table 15.   Examples from APAN data Security theme coded as Planning/Replanning. 




1. This effort will be used to collect information to synchronize and optimize 
enterprise efforts. 
TIE PR 
2. I have made contact with several organisations that will need to have advance 
ground image knowledge to create an analysis of what will be required for 
security, construction and logistics of building out such needs. 
TIE PR 
3. This intel is going to be important for planning and logistics issues on a variety 
of fronts, such as installation and manning communications solutions throughout 
Haiti. 
TKS PR 
4. It would seem to me that another way of getting these people out of the disaster 
area would be to take them by ship to a place to be screened. 
TSOG PR 
5. Like GITMO, or some place nearby, or to a U.S. port. TSOG PR 
6. This is why I had hoped posting here that because of the major upgrades to new 
systems in the U.S. that radios could be reused in Haiti. 
TSOG PR 
7. We do have a person in Haiti who can meet with whomever appropriate if this 
can help bridge gaps. 
TSOG PR 
8. This forum would be a good place to start, particularly during the high tempo 
phase of SSTR [stability, security, transition and reconstruction]. 
TSOG PR 
9. As for other issues such as trust, lack of use concerns and our inputs and what 
other assets will this be used for other operations and additional concerns that 
others may have being involved in this program, I agree that a forum should be 
created for such a dialogue. 
TSOG PR 
10. I would recommend that it be created as a separate section and forum area. TSOG PR 
11. So that appropriate discussion and resources can be tasked to it and subscribed 
by those that need to begin those first steps. 
TENA PR 
12. And wish to learn more about this portal, its users and watch how it unfolds and 
enables valuable resources to work together. 
TENA PR 
13. I would also like to suggest that a set of definitions of future planning and 
information planning is defined and posted on the blog section. 
TSOG PR 
14. And be aware of the functions this and other forums will be used for, hopefully 
channeling appropriate resources more efficiently. 
TENA PR 
15. Given the past USG [United States government] investment in training and 
supporting the HNP [Haiti National Police] and its special swat and CIMO units, 
we are prepared now to provide enhanced training without limiting their 
availability to work. 
TIE PR 
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Table 16.   Examples from APAN data Relief Logistics theme coded as 
Planning/Replanning. 




1. If this doesn’t work, I will contact the Marine NGA NST and they will call 
in a team member to push the links to those that need them. 
TIE PR 
2. Tactical Solution - use 5k and 10K Cargo nets as slings under RW [rotary 
wing] to deliver supplies to IDP [internally displaced persons] areas and 
distribution points. 
TSOG PR 
3. If not available - try also Jumbo Bags/super sacks/IB bags. TSOG PR 
4. This site can be used for temporary residence for the Armed forces, medical 
care or storage. 
TSOG PR 
5. They are currently looking for strategic locations to put up tent camps and I 
believe your location will be fantastic. 
TSOG PR 
6. I think the main thing I’d recommend is that the NGOs you are speaking to 
get their needs communicated back into the system. 
TKS PR 
7. Tasking which could fill those gaps with geo-rectified imagery would be 
incredibly valuable, from either satellite or aerial platforms. 
TENA PR 
8. The main thing is to get them off the island and out of the way of the relief 
effort, but to still maintain security. 
TKS PR 
9. If you have only a handful of personnel to get in country, I recommend 
getting to Homestead ARB and getting on one of the C-130s that is rotating 
in and out every day. 
TSOG PR 
10. If unable to meet scheduled arrival slot times, contact the Haiti flight 
operations coordination center or your controlling agency to coordinate new 
slot times. 
TSOG PR 
11. If you are U.S. based, logistics for delivery and how, who will pick up will 
have to be sorted out, but I am sure U.S. SOUTHCOM team can facilitate 
given the needs for security throughout Haiti’s affected area. 
TSOG PR 
12. We can also get a chartered bus (28 passengers) and trucks for transporting 
cargo. 
TSOG PR 
13. This might solve some of the logistics issue near Haiti if the supplies are 
coordinated farther out prior to entering the region. 
TENA PR 
14. If you are stuck you can catch a charter bus back to DR [Dominican 
Republic] and catch a commercial flight from there. 
TSOG PR 
15. We are exploring every private option including driving to MIA [Miami 
International Airport] for lift from there. 
TSOG PR 
 
3. Sensemaking  
Sensemaking (SM) is the process of framing and reframing inputs to the problem 
in order to help filter and interpret data.  Tables 17 and 18 provide example of 
Sensemaking found in the Security and Relief Logistics themes respectively.  Every SM 
code assigned in the data corresponded to the TKS code.   
There were fewer instances of SM compared to other NDM codes because of the 
nature of the data.  The Haiti earthquake required relief workers to provide a rapid 
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response on a host of issues.  Users came up with short-term solutions to problems and 
moved on to other issues.  There was little time spent revisiting the same issue.  
Additionally, most users were not concerned with long-term difficult problems, which are 
the kinds of issues that require the framing and reframing process captured in the SM 
code.  Long-term problems, such as removal of the massive amounts of rubble and large-
scale restoration of power and water, were problems that needed to be resolved by other 
organizations such as the IHRC.  Other studies will likely capture more instances of SM 
as team members deal with larger and long-term problems. 
 
Table 17.   Examples from APAN data Security theme coded as Sensemaking. 




1. I agree that if the technical specs are out of whack, it’ll be tough. TKS SM 
2. This question of security and the rumors of security and the racism behind 
the idea of security has been our major block to getting aid in. 
TKS SM 
3. And that’s the best we can do right now. TKS SM 
4. We just lack the capacity to get it done. TKS SM 
5. [It] would help a lot if military came across as focused primarily on 
humanitarian aid delivery. 
TKS SM 
6. And less on security. TKS SM 
7. I believe there is such hunger that food brings out the beast in any uprooted 
survivor of a 12 day old disaster. 
TKS SM 
8. But, gents, this is food and I fear for their safety. TKS SM 
9. Critical immediate and long-term assistance to the Haitian people will pivot 
on the ability to provide security. 
TKS SM 
10. No doubt changing the interface at this point would be challenging, just as 
rearranging furniture becomes essentially impossible once folks are already 
sitting in the chairs. 
TKS SM 














Table 18.   Examples from APAN data Relief/Logistics/NGOs theme coded as 
Sensemaking. 




1. Security on the ground is [a] must for proper/efficient and safe distribution 
of supplies. 
TKS SM 
2. That is the best place to get your medical equipment to PaP, not Miami. TKS SM 
 
4. Using Analogues  
The Using Analogues (UA) code was assigned when a user compared the 
situations encountered in Haiti to a past experience.  There were few instances of the UA 
code.  This code was only assigned eight times by both coders.  This low count may be a 
reflection of the devastation in Haiti.  Some users simply may have never experienced a 
similar level of destruction.  Or perhaps relief workers did not have much experience 
with earthquake related disasters despite having experience with other types of disasters.  
Finally users may have simply not have shared previous experiences because they were 
not applicable to the situation in Haiti.   
One example of an instance where the UA code was assigned occurred in a post 
by an U.S. Air Force individual operating out of the Toussaint Louverture International 
Airport.  He noted that during the relief efforts after Hurricane Katrina there was a 
problem of assigning too many slot times to aircraft.  A slot time is a period of time that a 
plane has to take off from an airport.  Assigning too many slot times can cause 
congestion at the airport.  This user utilized his past experience to improve operations 
during the Haiti relief effort.  Table 19 provides examples of the UA code taken from the 
data. 
Table 19.   Examples from APAN data Security theme coded as Using Analogues. 




1. Same bags filled with sand used for rapid levee repair by rw [rotary wing] in 
Katrina. 
TIE UA 
2. Here in Alaska, we do not deal in large populations, but we do deal in 





D. INTER-RATER RELIABILITY 
 Cohen’s kappa coefficient was used to determine inter-rater reliability and was 
applied to both sets of data for the cognitive processes included in the Fiore et al. model.  
The value of the Cohen’s kappa method for the data from the Security theme was .437 
indicating a moderate amount of agreement between the two coders.  The value of 
Cohen’s Kappa method for the Relief Logistics theme was higher than the Security theme 
at a value of .663.  This value corresponds to a substantial amount of agreement between 
the two coders.  An inter-rater reliability analysis of NDM codes was not conducted since 
there were substantially fewer NDM codes assigned than Fiore et al. codes. 
Table 20.  Table 20 provides a comparison of the coding assignments issued by 
each coder for the Security theme using only the Fiore et al. codes and the DTA codes.  
Table 21 provides the same data for the Relief Logistics theme.  Table 22 and Table 23 
provide coding comparisons of  the NDM codes for the Security and Relief Logistics 
theme, respectively.  A null code was assigned in instances where a NDM code was not 
used.   
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Table 20.   Coding Comparisons for the Security Theme with Only Fiore et al. and 
Decision to Take Action Codes  
Row Labels 
DTA-
COA DTA-RTA IIG MISC NA TENA TIE TKS TPPR TSOG Total Coder 2 Percent of Tot
DTA-COA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [0%] 
DTA-RTA 0 6 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 12 [1.7%] 
IIG 0 3 50 1 0 0 13 1 0 0 68 [9.4%] 
MISC 0 0 1 26 0 0 13 0 0 0 40 [5.5%] 
NA 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 4 [0.6%] 
TENA 0 0 0 0 0 9 10 6 1 7 33 [4.6%] 
TIE 0 10 3 30 0 8 425 7 0 15 498 [69%] 
TKS 0 0 1 1 0 1 54 7 0 3 67 [9.3%] 
TPPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [0%] 
TSOG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [0%] 
Total Coder 1 0 19 55 58 2 18 522 22 1 25 722 [100%] 
Percent of Total [0%] [2.6%] [7.6%] [8%] [0.3%] [2.5%] [72.3%] [3%] [0.1%] [3.5%] [100%]   
Table 21.   Coding Comparisons for the Relief Logistics Theme with Only Fiore et al. and 
Decision to Take Action Codes 
Row Labels DTA-COA DTA-RTA IIG MISC NA NC TENA TIE TKS TPPR TSOG Total Coder
DTA-COA 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 
DTA-RTA 0 40 5 2 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 71 
IIG 0 1 95 0 0 0 0 21 0 1 2 120 
MISC 0 0 0 126 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 139 
NA 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
NC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TENA 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 21 8 0 10 44 
TIE 0 8 5 6 0 6 4 761 3 0 21 814 
TKS 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 49 9 0 2 61 
TPPR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TSOG 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Total Coder 1 0 53 105 134 5 6 8 892 20 1 35 1259 
Percent of Total [0%] [4.2%] [8.3%] [10.6%] [0.4%] [0.5%] [0.6%] [70.8%] [1.6%] [0.1%] [2.8%] [100%]
Table 22.   Coding Comparisons for the Security Theme Using Only NDM Codes 
Row Labels AT NA NULL PD PR SM UA Total Coder 2 Percent of Total
AT 0 0 4 0 4 1 0 9 [1.2%] 
NA 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 [0.6%] 
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NULL 1 0 572 34 28 13 1 649 [89.9%] 
PD 0 0 30 18 0 1 0 49 [6.8%] 
PR 0 0 6 0 3 0 0 9 [1.2%] 
SM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [0%] 
UA 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 [0.3%] 
Total Coder 1 1 2 615 52 35 15 2 722 [100%] 
Percent of Total [0.1%] [0.3%] [85.2%] [7.2%] [4.8%] [2.1%] [0.3%] [100%]   
 
Table 23.   Coding Comparisons for the Relief Logistics Theme Using Only NDM codes 
Row Labels AT NA NC NULL PD PR SM UA Total Coder 2 Percent of Total
AT 2 0 0 3 4 3 2 0 14 [1.1%] 
NA 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 [0.5%] 
NC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 [0%] 
NULL 2 0 6 1093 26 18 6 3 1154 [91.6%] 
PD 1 0 0 28 42 0 0 0 71 [5.6%] 
PR 0 0 0 3 1 6 1 0 11 [0.9%] 
SM 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 3 [0.2%] 
UA 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 [0.1%] 
Total Coder 1 5 6 6 1129 73 29 9 3 1260 [100%] 
Percent of Total [0.4%] [0.5%] [0.5%] [89.6%] [5.8%] [2.3%] [0.7%] [0.2%] [100%]   
 
E. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE DATA 
 There was a trend of relief workers using offline communications within the data.  
Offline communications involve instances where APAN users coordinated their efforts 
through other means than the APAN site.  On numerous occasions users were directed to 
contact an individual directly via email or telephone.  Information shared in this manner 
was not available on APAN.  This was problematic since this approach to collaboration  
 
 
prevents other users from seeing the information exchanged to resolve the issue.  A user 
may have viewed a discussion thread about a topic they were concerned with only to find 
that a solution to the issue raised was not available on APAN.   
 There were likely many more instances of offline communications that were not 
readily apparent in the data.  Most users listed their contact information at the end of 
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every thread.  This was generally followed by a comment suggesting that other users 
could contact them directly for information.  It is not clear how many users collaborated 
via this means.  If many users took this approach then that would mean that the entire 
conversation, including the question, would not be available on APAN.  Any potential 
issues raised would not have been available for the group to see.  In several instances it 
appeared that an APAN user did not get any response to their question.  This is likely 
because a responding user contacted the first user directly using their contact information 
listed at the bottom of their post.   
Of course not all communications need to be shared on the APAN site.  Some 
issues may be so specific to the user that they may not be applicable to everyone else.  
However, at least the start of most of these conversations should be on APAN so other 
users can have insight and situational awareness of the current issues.  An example of this 
was with the issue of adoptions.  One APAN user stated that they were looking for 
information for a U.S. soldier who was trying to adopt a child of his deceased friend in 
Haiti.  Another user responded by stating that adoptions to foreigners were closed in Haiti 
and that it may take some time for them to resume.  The responding user asked additional 
clarifying questions about this specific soldier and recommended that the first user 
contact her via email.   
This method of providing at least the start of the conversation on the collaboration 
site was useful.  It alerted other users that adoptions in Haiti have been suspended and it 
let them know who to contact for more information.  This interaction also provides a 
good example of when it is appropriate to conduct offline communications.  Continuing 
the discussion off the APAN site was appropriate in this case since further conversations  
 
 
will likely focus on the specifics on that particular soldier’s case. Sharing this information 
over a public site such as APAN is a violation of privacy concerns.  Thus, continuing the 
conversation off the site was beneficial.   
 Offline communications were also detrimental to our analysis of the data.  Several 
conversations raised an issue but were resolved off of the APAN site preventing the 
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authors from observing the collaboration process that occurred to resolve the issue.  
Recognizing an issue is an important part of the collaboration process but so is 
determining the approach to solving the problem.  Problem solving is at the heart of the 
team collaboration process and in several cases that process was not observed.  There 
may have been more instances of TSOG, TENA, DTA-RTA and other codes present in 
the data if these conversations were captured.  Offline communications also prevented the 
authors from having a clearer picture of the events that occurred during the relief efforts.  
It was difficult in some instances to assign a proper code without the proper background 
discussion.   
Reaching a level of common understanding can be difficult in situations where 
different groups operate together for the first time.  One example of this is with 
acronyms.  Some APAN users utilized acronyms that other users were unfamiliar with.  
This can certainly be a problem when military and civilians operate together given the 
preponderance of acronym use in the military.  Sometimes even seemingly common 
terms were ambiguous to the uninformed.  Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) is a 
term used to refer to all aid organizations that are not affiliated with a government.  It is a 
common term used in the U.S. government but apparently not one that is universally used 
among aid organizations.  One APAN user did not understand the acronym NGO.  The 
user asked “who/what is the NGO?” and “what is their contact info.”  The user also asked 
“are they already on the ground in Haiti?”  This user observed a discussion about NGOs 
and assumed the acronym referred to a single organization instead of a general term 
applied to a certain type of group.  This kind of confusion regarding terminology 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. BENEFITS OF THIS STUDY 
 This study has demonstrated the applicability of the CKI program’s model of 
team collaboration to one example of inter-organizational collaboration under real-world 
conditions.  Utilizing data from APAN provided an excellent opportunity to observe 
inter-organizational collaboration during a disaster response.   Aid workers during the 
crisis were forced to come together to deal with a host of issues.  The Haitian 
government’s ability to respond to the earthquake was severely limited due to the loss of 
so many of their government buildings and personnel.  The United Nations mission in 
Haiti was also devastated since their headquarters was destroyed in the disaster.  The loss 
of these entities created a situation where aid workers needed to work together to de-
conflict efforts and exchange information.  The motivation to share information and 
resources was strong because of necessity.  The disaster created a chaotic situation for 
relief personnel to work through.  This situation provided an ample of amount of data to 
study in order to validate the model.   
 The high percentage use of Team Information Exchange (TIE) indicates the 
APAN site was primarily used for the exchange of information.  Information exchange 
was important given the chaotic nature of the situation and the fact that so many different 
organizations were involved in the relief operation.  However, several additional 
processes were used which indicates the relative use of macrocognitive processes by aid 
workers during the Haiti relief effort.  We have observed that there were few senior to 
subordinate relationships among the aid workers since there were few Decision To Take 
Action-Course of Action (DTA-COA) codes utilized.  Instead decisions to act came in 
the form of requests between peers.  The model has also shown that aid workers in Haiti 
were primarily concerned with dealing with immediate issues rather than long-term 
issues as indicated by the large amount of Problem Detection (PD) codes compared to 
Sensemaking (SM) or Anticipatory Thinking (AT) codes.  These examples show that the 
models were effective in analyzing team collaboration during the disaster.   
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B. COMMENTS ABOUT THE APAN SITE  
 APAN provided a means for a disparate group of organizations to come together 
to exchange information and coordinate their efforts.  The fact that so many different 
groups participated in the discussions on the site is one example of the site’s usefulness.  
Sometimes even the seemingly insurmountable was achieved on APAN.  For example, 
one user stated there was a need for a Computerized Axial Tomography (CAT) scan 
machine in Haiti to help diagnose patients.  These machines are very expensive; one user 
noted that one model sells for about $44,000.  The user posted the need for the equipment 
and soon another user responded by stating that there was a doctor in Miami who wanted 
to donate a CT scanner to the relief effort for free.  The site was even used to coordinate 
the actual delivery of the scanner.  If the APAN site was not available then these two 
users may have had a harder time determining each other’s needs and the availability of 
relief supplies.  Getting the word out was one of the most effective parts of APAN.  
Alerting users to current and potential issues was crucial to the operation.   
APAN was not perfect, despite it’s success.  It is important to note the site’s 
shortfalls.  One user, who was critical of the APAN site, stated that security on the site 
was very strict particularly with passwords.  Passwords on the site needed to be very long 
which made them hard to remember.  Access concerns are an important issue.  If a site 
requires too much security then people will not use it.  In the case of Haiti there were not 
many other collaboration sites available but that will not always be the case in other 
disasters.  Spreading collaboration efforts throughout multiple sites would not be ideal 
since doing so would make it more difficult to find information.  Too much security 
could prevent users from registering and using the site.  If the registration procedures for 
the site are too long or cumbersome then users may simply give up.  Of course, a degree 
of security is important, as users need to feel their questions are being responded to by 
reputable sources and not by someone simply claiming to be an official.  Inaccurate 
information can be extremely costly in a disaster response environment.  Striking a 
proper balance between security and openness will be a key to the future use of APAN.   
Getting past concerns about over-militarization of relief work is another issue.  
Civilians may not always trust the U.S. military.  This is particularly true with aid 
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workers from foreign countries.  The site should be portrayed as a partnership with the 
NGO community instead of as an operation run solely by the U.S. government.  If users 
feel they are part of the process they will make the site better by adding more information 
and offering constructive criticism.   
This site should remain user friendly and simple to use.  It should not require 
extensive training.  Keeping the site easy to use will encourage use among non-
technologically savvy individuals.  Individuals may be reluctant to share information on 
the site if the site is too complicated.  If the site is too difficult to use then the talents of 
many innovative people may be lost.  There are plenty of intelligent people out there who 
may not have the technical experience to overcome the learning barrier required to utilize 
the site.   
The issue of offline communications, where users communicate through other 
means besides the site, is likely to continue.  Many users simply feel more confident 
about asking questions or dealing with issues directly with another person.  This is 
particularly true if the issue they are concerned with is an important one.  Many users do 
not want to post an issue to a site that may linger in obscurity.  Most people prefer a 
direct response through email or phone calls where they feel more confident they can get 
an answer even if the answer is “I do not know.”  Site administrators should encourage 
users to at a minimum start conversations on APAN so that other users know who to 
contact to obtain more information.         
C. RECOMMENDED FURTHER STUDIES 
It should be remembered that a model is not reality, but is only an abbreviated 
representation of reality (Science Education Resource Center at Carleton College, 2011).  
George E. P. Box once said, “All models are wrong but some are useful” (as cited in 
Science Education Resource Center at Carleton College, 2011).  Validation of any given 
model may then be viewed as a process that incrementally increases the accuracy and, 





complex than any model, the model will never duplicate reality.  However, the model 
may eventually reach a point at which further validation will not produce an appreciable 
increase in accuracy for a given level of effort.   
The empirical model of team collaboration is not likely at this point of 
diminishing returns.  As such, further validation efforts are warranted.  The March 2011 
Japan earthquake, like the 2010 Haiti earthquake, was the subject of a global relief effort 
and APAN was used again to coordinate relief efforts.  This presents another opportunity 
to further validate the model.   
Team collaboration during exercise planning may also yield relevant data.  The 
team collaboration efforts during this study were largely devoted to dealing with 
immediate issues.  The nature of disaster relief operations requires an immediate response 
to issues in order to save as many lives as possible.   Planning efforts do not have the 
same time constraints.  Planning for future events allow teams to coordinate efforts 
without having to deal with immediate issues.  This should allow further examination of 
macrocognitive processes, which are part of the Fiore et al. model, for which we did not 
see ample evidence in this study.  These include AT, TSOG and TENA.  Expansion of 
the study domain into planning efforts would also yield valuable data on naturalistic 
decision making, as described in the Klein NDM model in previous chapters.   
Another study could also focus on team collaboration efforts within a hierarchical 
command structure.  This type of study will provide a better analysis of the 
macrocognitive processes occurring in the team environment in which a course of action 
could be directed by a superior, signified by the DTA-COA code.  The horizontal nature 
of the Haiti relief effort prevented the observation of DTA-COAs because there were few 
observable instances of a senior to subordinate relationship.  Additionally, few actual 
decisions were made on APAN.  Most of the conversations on APAN revolved around 
alerting others to issues or determining the availability of resources.  An examination of a 
hierarchical command structure would allow for a broader range of macrocognitive 
processes.   
Collaboration efforts within other task domains should also be studied to further 
validate the model.  Disaster response efforts provide one opportunity to examine team 
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members while under stress and likely while sleep deprived.  Disaster relief efforts also 
bring a wide range of different groups together.  This was certainly true during disaster 
relief efforts in Haiti where a number of different organizations from different nations 
operated together.  These types of high tempo operations allow for a detailed examination 
of team collaboration under difficult situations and with unfamiliar individuals.   
Evaluating the model, using tools other than APAN, may reveal different aspects 
of team collaboration.  APAN was useful for introducing a problem and introduction of 
team members, but relief workers evidenced few solution options and evaluation of those 
options as indicated by the relatively low instances of TENA and TSOG codes.  Often, 
APAN recorded team collaboration on a specific issue up to the point of the exchange of 
personal contact information.  After this, the remainder of team collaboration on this 
problem was not recorded on APAN.  Presumably, team collaboration continued via 
radio, telephone calls and emails until the problem was resolved to the satisfaction of the 
people involved.  This lack of evidence of use of TSOG and TENA may be less the fault 
of APAN and more the inclination of the relief workers.  They may have preferred direct 
interaction, such as via telephone calls.  Relief workers may have wanted to hear the 
person’s voice or felt that a verbal exchange was more dynamic than entering a solution 
and getting a response via keyboarding.  Examination of other collaboration tools may 
capture the entire collaborative process, including resolution of the issue, that APAN did 
not capture.   
Future studies should hold longer practice coding sessions.  Our study contained 
two practice coding sessions with two sets of codes of about two hundred thought units.  
As noted previously, most codes were assigned a TIE code and, likewise, most of the 
codes from this practice session were TIE codes.  Longer practice coding sessions will 
provide more extensive practice and thought units that exhibit other codes.  The largest 
disagreements between the two coders occurred with the rarely used codes.  Longer 
practice coding sessions should alleviate this problem since more examples will be 
present.  Also, practice coding sessions should include thought units from samples of the 
same data the thesis is utilizing.  One of the practice coding sessions utilized for this 
study was based on thought units from a previous thesis on team collaboration during the 
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terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  This practice session was beneficial, but it did 
not provide a common understanding of the data.  The second practice coding session 
proved more useful, since it was based on APAN data.  This session provided an 
opportunity to examine the way the data was structured.   
A question that arose in the course of this study pertained to the correlation 
between the level of stress in a scenario and the quality and effectiveness of team 
collaboration.  If the level of stress rises, does the quality of team collaboration rise with 
it, or does it diminish?  Does this relationship between stress and collaboration quality 
remain constant, or does it change at different levels of stress.  Does this vary with the 
level of expertise of the team members?  It may be conjectured that there is a level of 
stress at which communication breaks down and any further stress in the scenario all but 
makes team collaboration impossible.  Further research, which would include self-
reported measures of stress levels and performance measures, determining the veracity of 
this conjecture may be valuable to the study of team collaboration.   
The Cohen’s kappa statistical analysis of the Fiore et al. model codes was a useful 
mechanism of determining inter-rater reliability.  However, such a reliability mechanism 
for the NDM model codes was lacking, due to the low amount of NDM codes present in 
the data.  Other studies may yield more instances of NDM codes.  Though technically a 
statistical area of research, this would doubtless prove useful in rating the reliability of 
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